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THE COPYRIGHT ACT’S MANDATORY-
DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT: UNNECESSARY 
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Drew Thornley* 
          Many people are unaware of a federal copyright statute that 
requires owners of material published in the United States to furnish the 
federal government with two copies of each item published. Section 
407(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C. § 407) states that “the 
owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of publication in a work 
published in the United States shall deposit, within three months after the 
date of such publication—(1) two complete copies of the best edition; or 
(2) if the work is a sound recording, two complete phonorecords of the 
best edition, together with any printed or other visually perceptible 
material published with such phonorecords.” A recent lawsuit highlights 
constitutional problems with this statutory provision and the undue 
burdens it can place on publishers. 
          Valancourt has published more than 400 books and adds about 
twenty new titles yearly; but unlike traditional publishers, Valancourt 
does not keep copies in stock. Rather, it employs a print-on-demand 
model, wherein “James edits each book and lays out galleys, but nothing 
is physically printed until a customer or retailer actually orders a book.” 
Not keeping books in stock proved problematic when Valancourt 
received an email on June 11, 2018, from the United States Copyright 
Office, stating that Valancourt was not complying with the mandatory-
deposit requirement and that if he did not comply, he could face large 
fines. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the matter, Valancourt 
filed a lawsuit in federal court, challenging the constitutionality of 
section 407, in light of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the 
First Amendment’s protections of freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press. 
          This Article argues that the mandatory-deposit requirement is 
unnecessary and, on at least three grounds, unconstitutional. 
  
 
 * Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Stephen F. Austin State University; J.D., Harvard 
Law School; B.A., The University of Alabama.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many people are unaware of a federal copyright statute that 
requires owners of material published in the United States to furnish 
the federal government with two copies of each item published. 
Section 407(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 states: 
[T]he owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of 
publication in a work published in the United States shall 
deposit, within three months after the date of such 
publication—(1) two complete copies of the best edition; or 
(2) if the work is a sound recording, two complete 
phonorecords of the best edition, together with any printed 
or other visually perceptible material published with such 
phonorecords.1  
A recent lawsuit highlights constitutional problems with this statutory 
provision and the undue burdens it can place on publishers. Part II of 
this Article highlights the details of section 407. Part III reveals the 
story behind the lawsuit. Part IV outlines legal arguments against 
section 407. 
II.  SECTION 407 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
Section 407(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) states 
that, subject to certain exceptions discussed below, 
the owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of 
publication in a work published in the United States shall 
deposit, within three months after the date of such 
publication—(1) two complete copies of the best edition; or 
(2) if the work is a sound recording, two complete 
phonorecords of the best edition, together with any printed 
or other visually perceptible material published with such 
phonorecords.2  
This requirement is known as the “mandatory-deposit requirement.”3 
A mandatory deposit, which can also be referred to as a “legal 
 
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2012). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES: 
CHAPTER 1500 66, https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/chap1500/ch1500-deposits.pdf (Sept. 29, 
2017). 
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deposit,”4 is made to “the Copyright Office for the use or disposition 
of the Library of Congress”5 but is not required in order to receive 
copyright protection.6 The United States Copyright Office’s 
Copyright Acquisitions Division administers the Act’s mandatory-
deposit requirements.7 
This Article focuses on the non-sound-recording deposit 
requirement that “two complete copies of the best edition”8 must be 
submitted to the United States Copyright Office. Per the clear 
language of the statute, it is not sufficient to submit any two copies of 
a work. Rather, two “complete” copies of the “best” edition of a work 
must be deposited.9 A “complete” copy “includes all elements 
comprising the unit of publication of the best edition of the work, 
including elements that, if considered separately, would not be 
copyrightable subject matter or would otherwise be exempt from 
mandatory deposit requirements under paragraph (c) of this section.”10 
The “best” edition is “the edition, published in the United States at any 
time before the date of deposit, that the Library of Congress 
determines to be most suitable for its purposes.”11 
 
 4. Id. at 1. 
 5. See 17 U.S.C. § 407(b) (2012). 
 6. See id. § 407(a). The deposit requirements of section 407 are distinct from the deposit 
requirements of section 408, which concerns copyright registration. Regarding copyright deposit, 
see 37 C.F.R. § 202.20 (2019). 
 7. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES: 
CHAPTER 100 1 https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/redlines/chap100.pdf (Sept. 29, 2017). 
 8. Id. 
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2012). 
 10. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19 (2018). 
 11. Id. § 202.19(b)(1)(i). Appendix B to 37 C.F.R. § 202 describes the “best edition” 
requirement in more detail, stating,  
The criteria to be applied in determining the best edition of each of several 
types of material are listed below in descending order of importance. In 
deciding between two editions, a criterion-by-criterion comparison should be 
made. The edition which first fails to satisfy a criterion is to be considered of 
inferior quality and will not be an acceptable deposit. Example: If a 
comparison is made between two hardbound editions of a book, one a trade 
edition printed on acid-free paper, and the other a specially bound edition 
printed on average paper, the former will be the best edition because the type 
of paper is a more important criterion than the binding. 
 37 C.F.R. § 202, Appendix B (2019). The criteria for “printed textual matter” are as follows:  
A. Paper, Binding, and Packaging: 1. Archival-quality rather than less-
permanent paper. 2. Hard cover rather than soft cover. 3. Library binding 
rather than commercial binding. 4. Trade edition rather than book club edition. 
5. Sewn rather than glue-only binding. 6. Sewn or glued rather than stapled or 
spiral-bound. 7. Stapled rather than spiral-bound or plastic-bound. 8. Bound 
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The Act gives the Register of Copyrights the authority to exempt 
certain works from the deposit requirement,12 and a party may request 
 
rather than looseleaf, except when future looseleaf insertions are to be issued. 
In the case of looseleaf materials, this includes the submission of all binders 
and indexes when they are part of the unit as published and offered for sale or 
distribution. Additionally, the regular and timely receipt of all appropriate 
looseleaf updates, supplements, and releases including supplemental binders 
issued to handle these expanded versions, is part of the requirement to 
properly maintain these publications. 9. Slip-cased rather than nonslip-cased. 
10. With protective folders rather than without (for broadsides). 11. Rolled 
rather than folded (for broadsides). 12. With protective coatings rather than 
without (except broadsides, which should not be coated). B. Rarity: 1. Special 
limited edition having the greatest number of special features. 2. Other limited 
edition rather than trade edition. 3. Special binding rather than trade binding. 
C. Illustrations: 1. Illustrated rather than unillustrated. 2. Illustrations in color 
rather than black and white. D. Special Features: 1. With thumb notches or 
index tabs rather than without. 2. With aids to use such as overlays and 
magnifiers rather than without. E. Size: 1. Larger rather than smaller sizes. 
(Except that large-type editions for the partially-sighted are not required in 
place of editions employing type of more conventional size.).  
37 C.F.R. § 202, Appendix B (2019). A party may request “special relief” from the “best edition” 
requirement. See 37 C.F.R. § 202, Appendix B (2019) (“Under regulations of the Copyright Office, 
potential depositors may request authorization to deposit copies or phonorecords of other than the 
best edition of a specific work (e.g., a microform rather than a printed edition of a serial), by 
requesting ‘special relief’ from the deposit requirements. All requests for special relief should be 
in writing and should state the reason(s) why the applicant cannot send the required deposit and 
what the applicant wishes to submit instead of the required deposit.”). 
 12. See 17 U.S.C. § 407(c) (2012) (“The Register of Copyrights may by regulation exempt 
any categories of material from the deposit requirements of this section, or require deposit of only 
one copy or phonorecord with respect to any categories. Such regulations shall provide either for 
complete exemption from the deposit requirements of this section, or for alternative forms of 
deposit aimed at providing a satisfactory archival record of a work without imposing practical or 
financial hardships on the depositor, where the individual author is the owner of copyright in a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work and (i) less than five copies of the work have been published, 
or (ii) the work has been published in a limited edition consisting of numbered copies, the monetary 
value of which would make the mandatory deposit of two copies of the best edition of the work 
burdensome, unfair, or unreasonable.”). 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c) lists twelve categories of works that 
are exempt from subsection (a)’s mandatory-deposit requirements. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c) (2018) 
(“(c) Exemptions from deposit requirements. The following categories of material are exempt from 
the deposit requirements of section 407(a) of title 17: (1) Diagrams and models illustrating scientific 
or technical works or formulating scientific or technical information in linear or three-dimensional 
form, such as an architectural or engineering blueprint, plan, or design, a mechanical drawing, or 
an anatomical model. (2) Greeting cards, picture postcards, and stationery. (3) Lectures, sermons, 
speeches, and addresses when published individually and not as a collection of the works of one or 
more authors. (4) Literary, dramatic, and musical works published only as embodied in 
phonorecords. This category does not exempt the owner of copyright, or of the exclusive right of 
publication, in a sound recording resulting from the fixation of such works in a phonorecord from 
the applicable deposit requirements for the sound recording. (5) Electronic works published in the 
United States and available only online. This exemption includes electronic serials available only 
online only until such time as a demand is issued by the Copyright Office under the regulations set 
forth in § 202.24. This exemption does not apply to works that are published in both online, 
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“special relief” from the mandatory-deposit requirement to be granted 
at the discretion of the Register of Copyrights.13 Non-compliance with 
the deposit requirement can lead to a range of financial penalties.14 
 
electronic formats and in physical formats, which remain subject to the appropriate mandatory 
deposit requirements. (6) Three-dimensional sculptural works, and any works published only as 
reproduced in or on jewelry, dolls, toys, games, plaques, floor coverings, wallpaper and similar 
commercial wall coverings, textiles and other fabrics, packaging material, or any useful article. 
Globes, relief models, and similar cartographic representations of area are not within this category 
and are subject to the applicable deposit requirements. (7) Prints, labels, and other advertising 
matter, including catalogs, published in connection with the rental lease, lending, licensing, or sale 
of articles of merchandise, works of authorship, or services. (8) Tests, and answer material for tests 
when published separately from other literary works. (9) Works first published as individual 
contributions to collective works. This category does not exempt the owner of copyright, or of the 
exclusive right of publication, in the collective work as a whole, from the applicable deposit 
requirements for the collective work. (10) Works first published outside the United States and later 
published in the United States without change in copyrightable content, if: (i) Registration for the 
work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 before the work was published in the United States; or (ii) 
Registration for the work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 after the work was published in the United 
States but before a demand for deposit is made under 17 U.S.C. 407(d). (11) Works published only 
as embodied in a soundtrack that is an integral part of a motion picture. This category does not 
exempt the owner of copyright, or of the exclusive right of publication, in the motion picture, from 
the applicable deposit requirements for the motion picture. (12) Motion pictures that consist of 
television transmission programs and that have been published, if at all, only by reason of a license 
or other grant to a nonprofit institution of the right to make a fixation of such programs directly 
from a transmission to the public, with or without the right to make further uses of such fixations.”). 
 13. See 37 C.F.R § 202.19(e) (2018) (“(e) Special relief. (1) In the case of any published work 
not exempt from deposit under paragraph (c) of this section, the Register of Copyrights may, after 
consultation with other appropriate officials of the Library of Congress and upon such conditions 
as the Register may determine after such consultation: (i) Grant an exemption from the deposit 
requirements of section 407(a) of title 17 on an individual basis for single works or series or groups 
of works; or (ii) Permit the deposit of one copy or phonorecord, or alternative identifying material, 
in lieu of the two copies or phonorecords required by paragraph (d)(1) of this section; or (iii) Permit 
the deposit of incomplete copies or phonorecords, or copies or phonorecords other than those 
normally comprising the best edition; or (iv) Permit the deposit of identifying material which does 
not comply with § 202.21 of these regulations. (2) Any decision as to whether to grant such special 
relief, and the conditions under which special relief is to be granted, shall be made by the Register 
of Copyrights after consultation with other appropriate officials of the Library of Congress, and 
shall be based upon the acquisition policies of the Library of Congress then in force. (3) Requests 
for special relief under this paragraph shall be made in writing to the Chief, Examining Division, 
shall be signed by or on behalf of the owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of publication in 
the work, and shall set forth specific reasons why the request should be granted. (4) The Register 
of Copyrights may, after consultation with other appropriate officials of the Library of Congress, 
terminate any ongoing or continuous grant of special relief. Notice of termination shall be given in 
writing and shall be sent to the individual person or organization to whom the grant of special relief 
had been given, at the last address shown in the records of the Copyright Office. A notice of 
termination may be given at any time, but it shall state a specific date of termination that is at least 
30 days later than the date the notice is mailed. Termination shall not affect the validity of any 
deposit made earlier under the grant of special relief.”). 
 14. 17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (2012) (“At any time after publication of a work as provided by 
subsection (a), the Register of Copyrights may make written demand for the required deposit on 
any of the persons obligated to make the deposit under subsection (a). Unless deposit is made within 
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Parts of section 407’s house report15 are worth noting. For 
starters, it comments on the distinction between the mandatory-deposit 
requirement and copyright registration, stating, 
Under the 1909 statute, deposit of copies for the collections 
of the Library of Congress and deposit of copies for purposes 
of copyright registration have been treated as the same thing. 
The bill’s basic approach is to regard deposit and registration 
as separate though closely related: deposit of copies or 
phonorecords for the Library of Congress is mandatory, but 
exceptions can be made for material the Library neither 
needs nor wants; copyright registration is not generally 
mandatory, but is a condition of certain remedies for 
copyright infringement. Deposit for the Library of Congress 
can be, and in the bulk of cases undoubtedly will be, 
combined with copyright registration.16 
Secondly, works first published abroad and subsequently published in 
the United States are (with exception17) subject to the deposit 
requirement:  
Although the basic deposit requirements are limited to works 
“published with notice of copyright in the United States,” 
they would become applicable as soon as a work first 
published abroad is published in this country through the 
distribution of copies or phonorecords that are either 
imported or are part of an American edition.18  
 
three months after the demand is received, the person or persons on whom the demand was made 
are liable—(1) to a fine of not more than $250 for each work; and (2) to pay into a specially 
designated fund in the Library of Congress the total retail price of the copies or phonorecords 
demanded, or, if no retail price has been fixed, the reasonable cost to the Library of Congress of 
acquiring them; and (3) to pay a fine of $2,500, in addition to any fine or liability imposed under 
clauses (1) and (2), if such person willfully or repeatedly fails or refuses to comply with such a 
demand.”). 
 15. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976) (Conf. Rep.). 
 16. Id. at 150. 
 17. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(10) (2018). 
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 151 (1976) (Conf. Rep.). Likewise, the mandatory-deposit 
requirement applies to a work that is published simultaneously in the United States and another 
country. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 3, at 69 (“The mandatory deposit requirement only 
applies to works published in the United States. Unpublished works and works that are published 
solely outside the United States are not subject to this requirement. Mandatory deposit does apply 
to works that are published simultaneously in both a foreign country and in the United States. It 
applies to works that are first published in a foreign country and then subsequently published or 
distributed in this country.”). 
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Finally, the house report remarks on possible exemptions from the 
deposit requirement and its flexibility in balancing the needs of the 
Library of Congress versus the burdens of the deposit requirement on 
the owners of published works, stating that 
the fundamental criteria governing regulations issued under 
section 407(c), which allows exemptions from the deposit 
requirements for certain categories of works, would be the 
needs and wants of the Library. The purpose of this provision 
is to make the deposit requirements as flexible as possible, 
so that there will be no obligation to make deposits where it 
serves no purpose, so that only one copy or phonorecord may 
be deposited where two are not needed, and so that 
reasonable adjustments can be made to meet practical needs 
in special cases. The regulations, in establishing special 
categories for these purposes, would necessarily balance the 
value of the copies or phonorecords to the collections of the 
Library of Congress against the burdens and costs to the 
copyright owner of providing them.19 
Originally, per the Copyright Act of 1790,20 the nation’s first 
federal copyright law, depositing pre-publication copies of works with 
the federal government was required for copyright registration.21 The 
United States Copyright Office explains,  
In May 1790, when Congress enacted the first federal 
copyright law, the U.S. Copyright Office did not yet exist. 
Instead, authors and publishers recorded their claims with 
federal district courts and submitted copies of their works (in 
those days, book [sic], maps, and charts) in support of their 
applications. These works, known as deposits, were stored 
in a variety of places, including in the U.S. Department of 
State and the U.S. Department of the Interior.22  
In addition, post-publication deposits to the United States Secretary of 
State were required within six months after publication.23 This system 
remained until the second general revision of the Copyright Act in July 
 
 19. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 151 (1976) (Conf. Rep.). 
 20. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 125. 
 21. See Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Cong. ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 125. 
 22. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE supra note 7, at 1. 
 23. Copyright Act of 1790, 1. Cong. ch. 15, § 4, 1 Stat. 125, 125. 
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1870, which centralized the copyright system in the Library of 
Congress, which became the lone repository for deposits.24 The United 
States Copyright Office writes, “No legislation was more important to 
the development of the Library than that law, which required all 
authors to deposit in the Library two copies of every book, pamphlet, 
map, print, and piece of music registered in the United States.”25 In 
February 1897, Congress established the United States Copyright 
Office, which, among other functions, administers the mandatory-
deposit requirement.26 
III.  VALANCOURT BOOKS 
Valancourt Books (“Valancourt”) is “an independent small press 
specializing in the rediscovery of rare, neglected, and out-of-print 
fiction,” including “[g]othic, horror, and supernatural fiction” and 
LGBT-interest titles.27 Since “far too many great books remain out-of-
print and inaccessible,” in 2005, James Jenkins founded Valancourt 
“to restore many of these works to new generations of readers.”28 
Jenkins and his husband, Ryan Cagle, run Valancourt out of their 
house in Richmond, Virginia, with no employees.29 
Valancourt has published more than 400 books and adds about 
twenty new titles yearly;30 but unlike traditional publishers, 
Valancourt does not keep copies in stock.31 Rather, it employs a print-
on-demand model, wherein “James edits each book and lays out 
galleys, but nothing is physically printed until a customer or retailer 
actually orders a book.”32 Not keeping books in stock proved 
 
 24. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Our History, VALANCOURT BOOKS, http://www.valancourtbooks.com/our-history.html 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Nick Sibilla, Why Is the Federal Government Threatening an Indie Book Publisher with 
$100,000 in Fines?, FORBES (Aug. 30 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/ 
2018/08/30/why-is-the-federal-government-threatening-an-indie-book-publisher-with-100000-in-
fines/#737e28691335. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Virginia Books: Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, INST. FOR 
JUST., https://ij.org/case/virginia-books/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). The couple has painstakingly 
typed out manuscripts from microfiches and rare print editions (including from the only surviving 
copy for some books) and converted them to digital formats. So when a customer orders a book, 
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problematic when Valancourt received an email on June 11, 2018, 
from the United States Copyright Office, stating that Valancourt was 
not complying with the mandatory-deposit requirement and that if he 
did not comply, he could face large fines.33 The Institute for Justice 
(IJ) writes,  
To comply with the government’s demand, James would 
have to go online, order every single book from Valancourt’s 
back catalog, and then physically package each one up to 
ship to the Copyright Office. (The government’s demand 
letter contained 341 individual notices that, for tracking 
purposes, had to be included with each individual book 
James was supposed to send.) The process would have taken 
days and cost thousands of dollars.34 
 
Valancourt will send the digital files to a printing vendor, who then prints a single-bound volume. 
“This way, the books stay in print indefinitely,” Jenkins explained. Sibilla, supra note 29. 
 33. Virginia Books Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, supra note 
32; see 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2012). Writes Nick Sibilla,  
Failure to comply could result in fines of up to $250 per book, plus the book’s 
retail price. The government could further fine Valancourt up to $2,500 for 
“willfully or repeatedly” failing to comply with the deposit demand. (It’s 
unclear whether or not the ‘willful’ fine could apply just once to Valancourt’s 
case or if it could apply to each individual book.) Fines could quickly reach 
six figures. “Sending hundreds of our books to the government will cost us 
thousands of dollars and many hours of time, which cuts into our already 
limited resources for our mission to rescue rare and important literature,” 
Jenkins said. “But if we don’t send the books, the Copyright Office says they 
will fine us out of existence.”  
Sibilla, supra note 29.  
 34. Virginia Books Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, supra note 
32. According to IJ, “the only way that Valancourt can obtain copies of its works is by ordering 
them from the printer through its own online retail portal.” Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at 11, Valancourt Books, LLC v. Claggett, No. 1:18-cv-01922 (D. D.C. Aug. 16, 
2018). 
Moreover, Valancourt is actively expanding its catalog every year. Valancourt 
intends to continue publishing multiple books per year, but it does not want 
to send copies of each new work to the Copyright Office. Jenkins’ past 
experience participating voluntarily in the Cataloging-in-Publication program 
gives him direct knowledge that sending a copy of every single new title to 
the federal government is both expensive and time-consuming. Complying 
with the mandatory-deposit requirement on a forward-looking basis would 
result in at least hundreds of dollars in additional annual costs to Valancourt 
in addition to many hours of time diverted from its two-person staff’s already 
limited resources.  
Id. at 13. IJ writes,  
To make matters worse, James had already given many of these books to the 
federal government. When Valancourt first started publishing, it participated 
in the Library of Congress’s “Cataloging in Publication” program, in which 
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On June 12, 2018, Jenkins replied to the Copyright Office’s 
email, requesting it withdraw its demand.35 On August 9, 2018, the 
Copyright Office replied to Jenkins’s email, attaching a new demand 
letter for 240 books (rather than the 341 listed in their initial 
demand).36 On August 16, 2018, represented by IJ, Valancourt filed a 
lawsuit in federal court, challenging the constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 407, in light of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the First 
Amendment’s protections of freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press.37 The complaint states, 
Valancourt was unaware that it was legally obligated to 
deposit copies of every book it produced with the federal 
government until it received a written demand from the 
United States Copyright Office that it provide the 
government with copies of virtually every book in its 
catalog—341 in total—on pain of fines that could extend into 
six figures. Valancourt is now faced with an untenable 
choice: Comply with the Copyright Office’s demand for its 
past publications and deposit copies of each book it publishes 
 
publishers provide the Library with a free copy of a book in exchange for a 
Library of Congress catalog number that is meant to facilitate processing for 
libraries. After depositing more than 100 books this way, James eventually 
decided that providing these copies was too expensive and yielded little 
benefit, and so he stopped—but the Copyright Office was demanding that he 
give them additional copies of many of those 100 books anyway. James 
immediately explained all of this in an email he sent in response to the demand 
letter. Two months later, the Copyright Office finally replied—to inform him 
that he still needed to provide copies of books that contained any 
“copyrightable” material, even if he had already sent them to the Library of 
Congress for other reasons. For unexplained reasons, the new letter dropped 
the number of books demanded down to 240, but it still threatened crippling 
fines and warned Valancourt not to keep publishing books without sending 
copies to the federal government.  
Virginia Books Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, supra note 32. Nick 
Sibilla writes,  
To comply with the government’s demand, each book would have to be 
ordered, printed, bound, packed, and shipped individually. Jenkins estimates 
that compliance could cost $2,000 to $3,000—a significant sum for a niche 
publisher. “That’s a lot of money for a small business and it would take away 
from our mission, which is to publish these books,” Jenkins explained. “With 
the $2,000 or $3,000, that’s several new titles we could resurrect and bring 
back.” 
Sibilla, supra note 29. 
 35. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 34, at 11. 
 36. Id. at 12. 
 37. Id. at 1. 
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in the future (which would impose substantial burdens in 
terms of time and financial cost) or await a lawsuit from the 
Copyright Office seeking crippling fines. It therefore brings 
this action to clarify its rights and obligations under 17 
U.S.C. § 407 and the Constitution of the United States.38 
IV.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST SECTION 407’S 
MANDATORY-DEPOSIT REQUIREMENT 
My chief objections to the mandatory-deposit requirement are 
that it is unnecessary and unconstitutional. An examination of each 
objection follows. 
A.  Unnecessary 
Historically, there have been two purposes of a mandatory-
deposit requirement: “to identify the copyrighted work in connection 
with copyright registration, and to provide copies for the use of the 
Library of Congress.”39 The former is the original purpose, while the 
latter emerged decades afterward.40 
The first purpose (“to identify the copyrighted work in connection 
with copyright registration”) is no longer applicable and is, thus, a 
non-starter. Per the Copyright Act of 1976, registration of a work is no 
longer a requirement of copyright protection, which accrues 
automatically, whenever the work is created.41 However, the 1976 Act 
did not remove the mandatory-deposit requirement. So, the deposit 
mandate remained, but its initial reason for being did not. “Simply put, 
 
 38. Id. at 2. The Copyright Office’s demand letter to Valancourt instructed Valancourt to ship 
each of the 341 books separately, along with a copy of the relevant notice for each book. See id. at 
10. 
 39. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHTS, 83RD CONG., STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, PREPARED BY 
ELIZABETH K. DUNNE (Comm. Print 1960), https://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/ 
study20.pdf [hereinafter STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS]. 
 40. “From 1790 to 1870 the function of deposit was chiefly to serve as record evidence of the 
work covered by the copyright claim . . . From 1870 to 1909, under a completely centralized 
registration system at the Library of Congress, the deposit of two copies of each work provided 
equally for the maintenance of a copy as record evidence, as in the previous period, and as a means 
of enriching the Library.” Id. at 11. 
 41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 407(a) (2012). 
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the rationale for the book-deposit mandate went away decades ago,” 
writes IJ.42 
The second purpose (“to provide copies for the use of the Library 
of Congress”) remains but is insufficient. The proffered justification 
for this purpose is that it is culturally important to make deposits 
available to the Library of Congress.43 Perhaps the leading proponent 
of this view was Ainsworth Spofford, who served as the nation’s sixth 
Librarian of Congress.44 Spofford “envisioned it as the national 
library” and “was also convinced of the value of the copyright deposit 
to such an institution.”45 Ellen C. Dement writes that, after being 
named Librarian of Congress, 
Spofford immediately set to work establishing the Library’s 
national role, and he pursued this cause with energy and 
 
 42. Virginia Books Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, supra note 
32. 
 43. See STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, supra note  39. “The great value 
of the copyright deposit to the collections of the Library of Congress since 1870 has been 
recognized many times. In the past it has materially assisted the Library in building its collections 
on all aspects of American history, literature, law, music, and social culture.” Id. at 30. “The great 
value to the public of supplying copies of published works to a national library has long been 
recognized in the United States and in other countries.” Id. at 34.  
In 1846 the act establishing the Smithsonian Institution provided that one 
copy of each work for which a copyright should be secured under act of 
Congress should be delivered to the Librarian of the Smithsonian Institution 
and to the Librarian of Congress within 3 months after publication. The 
librarian appointed to the Smithsonian, Charles Jewett, felt that the copyright 
deposit had great importance for a national library: “To the public, the 
importance, immediate and prospective, of having a central depot, here all the 
products of the American press may be gathered, year by year, and preserved 
for reference, is very great. The interest with which those who in 1950 may 
consult this library would view a complete collection of all the works printed 
in America in 1850, can only be fully and rightly estimated by the historian 
and bibliographer, who has sought in vain for the productions of the past. . . . 
Thus, in coming years, the collection would form a documentary history of 
American letters, science, and art. It is greatly to be desired, however, that the 
collection should be complete, without a single omission. We wish for every 
book, every pamphlet, every printed or engraved production, however 
apparently insignificant. Who can tell what may be important in future 
centuries?”  
Id. at 12 (quoting BD. OF REGENTS OF THE SMITHSONIAN INST., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE, S. MISC. DOC. NO. 120 (1850)). 
 44. Spofford was appointed to the position on December 31, 1864, by President Abraham 
Lincoln and held the position until July 1, 1897. See Ainsworth Rand Spofford (1825–1908), LIBR. 
CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/item/n90613873/ainsworth-rand-spofford-1825-1908/. He 
“served as the de facto Register of Copyrights until the position of Register was created in 1897.” 
United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, supra note 24. 
 45. STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, supra note 39, at 13. 
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political skill. . . . In his annual reports to Congress, Spofford 
continually emphasized that a national library should be a 
permanent, comprehensive collection of national literature 
that represented “the complete product of the American mind 
in every department of science and literature.” 
Comprehensiveness was essential, for in his view the 
American national library should serve both the American 
citizenry and its elected representatives. Books and 
information were needed about all subjects and, as the library 
of the American government, the Library was the natural site 
for such a comprehensive collection.46 
Dement provides valuable insight into the larger context of these 
efforts by Spofford to create a national library and, thus, of the second 
purpose for mandatory deposits, writing that the rhetoric used to 
promote the idea of a national library was part of a nationalistic effort 
to establish the United States’ place in the educated, cultured world.47 
She writes, 
 
 46. Ainsworth Rand Spofford (1825–1908), supra note 44 (citing AINSWORTH RAND 
SPOFFORD: BOOKMAN AND LIBRARIAN (John Y. Cole ed., 1975)). Ellen C. Dement writes that 
Spofford had a  
vision of the Library of Congress as a national library which would help the 
country gain intellectual and cultural preeminence in western culture. The 
cornerstone of this project was the Copyright Law passed on July 8, 1870, 
which centralized all copyright activities at the Library and required a copy 
of every copyrighted work in the United States to be deposited there. By 
passing this law, Spofford argued to Congress, the legislature would provide 
a repository of American culture which would be “an invaluable aid to 
thousands” because “the Public intelligence and welfare are promoted by 
every extension of the means of acquiring knowledge.” The Copyright Law 
consolidated the vast majority of material published in America into what 
Spofford called “one truly great and comprehensive library, worthy of 
Congress and the nation.” 
Ellen C. Dement, The Making of a National Library, VAND. HIST. REV., Spring 2017, at 74, 74–
81. 
 47. Dement, supra note 46, at 74–81 (“This paper explores the transformation of the Library 
of Congress from simply a legislative library into the national library of the United States. This 
process occurred during Ainsworth Rand Spofford’s tenure as Librarian of Congress from 1864 to 
1897, and he was instrumental in establishing the institution’s status as the national library. I argue 
that Spofford’s key accomplishments, the Copyright Law of 1870 and the construction of a separate 
Library of Congress building between 1886 and 1896, were inextricably linked with the broader 
culture of late nineteenth century America. Without this cultural context, the Library would not 
have become the national library of the United States. The paper begins with an overview of the 
antebellum Library, which demonstrates its limited scope relative to the institution’s later 
expansion while recognizing developments during the period that contributed to its national 
character. I then move to a discussion of the Library under Spofford’s direction, examining the 
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The late nineteenth century witnessed a desire to create a 
uniquely American culture and edify the nation’s public on 
that culture. This desire was reflected in the transformation 
of the Library of Congress into America’s national library, 
which functioned as a symbolic center of the nation’s 
intellectual achievements. . . . [T]hrough the efforts of 
Spofford and his contemporaries, the Library of Congress 
became a truly national library that embodied the ideal of a 
national culture, freely accessible to all Americans, and an 
indispensable proponent of knowledge in the United States.48 
Since registration of a publication is no longer required in order 
to receive copyright protection, furnishing copies of works to the 
Library of Congress is the only reason for maintaining the mandatory-
deposit requirement. It is unclear precisely what this second purpose 
is truly about. Is it about building the country’s intellectual and 
cultural reputation—the early rhetoric mentioned above indicates as 
much—or about meeting the needs of the Library of Congress? These 
are entirely different propositions, but my position is that, in either 
case, the reason is insufficient to justify the mandatory-deposit 
requirement. 
Regarding the former case (building the country’s intellectual and 
cultural reputation), even if one accepts, as I do not, that, earlier in our 
country’s history, building up a robust national library in order to 
solidify our cultural standing in the world was sufficient justification 
for requiring publishers to send copies of their works to the Library of 
Congress, the times have changed enough that this justification is no 
longer legitimate. The United States’ cultural place in the world is 
 
rhetoric used to promote and disseminate the idea of a national library to Congress and the nation. 
Next, I connect this rhetoric to the larger growth of public libraries in the United States, with both 
the Library of Congress and municipal libraries presented as instruments to provide ‘culture’ to the 
American public. These establishments propagated a unified and homogenous definition of 
American culture ordained by an intellectual elite, who hoped that doing so would firmly establish 
America as a western civilization. The final section of this paper analyzes the construction of a 
separate Library of Congress building, which was used—particularly through its interior 
decorations—as a pedagogical tool to further advance a westernized definition of American culture 
by giving the American public ‘an insight into the colossal array of knowledge which the human 
mind has accumulated and still gathers together.’ Thus, the transformation of the Library of 
Congress into America’s national library was a direct manifestation of the ‘spirit of the age,’ 
coupling the nation’s nationalistic ambitions with its faith in the power of public institutions to 
cultivate learning and culture.”). 
 48. Id. at 80. 
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firmly entrenched, and publications are only a part of what makes the 
country culturally important. As such, we need not endeavor to 
establish ourselves as a center of education and culture via a 
comprehensive, centralized national library, certainly not at the literal 
expense of publishers. More fundamentally, a nation does not earn its 
intellectual and cultural stature by maintaining a repository of 
publications. Rather, it does so by its citizens’ producing those works 
in the first place. The true value to the public is found in the content 
of published works, not in their being collected. 
As for the latter case (meeting the needs of the Library of 
Congress), the mandatory-deposit requirement is not necessary to 
achieve the goals of the Library of Congress. According to the Library 
of Congress, 
The primary function of the Library of Congress is to serve 
the Congress. In addition, it provides service to government 
agencies, other libraries, scholars, and the general public 
through over twenty reading rooms and research centers. The 
Library welcomes public use of its collections and reference 
services, and endeavors to offer the widest possible use of 
those collections consistent with their preservation and with 
the Library’s obligation to serve the Congress and other 
government agencies.49 
Readily admitting that I certainly do not know all that is required by 
Congress and the various federal agencies, I offer that their respective 
functions and efforts would not be materially impeded were publishers 
not required to furnish copies of their works to the Library of 
Congress. Are Congress’s needs less served without copies of 
Valancourt Books’ “rare, neglected, and out-of-print fiction, including 
18th century gothic novels, Victorian horror novels, forgotten literary 
fiction, and early LGBT fiction”?50 Are they less served without 
copies of children books? Was Congress ill-served before the 
imposition of the legal-deposit requirement? Is Congress materially 
benefitted by the continual addition of works to a library that already 
 
 49. Using the Library’s Collections, LIBR. CONGRESS (last visited Feb. 23, 2020), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/useofcollections.html. 
 50. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 34, at 3. 
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houses more than 140 million works?51 The main (and original) 
purpose of the Library of Congress is to serve Congress, not to be a 
warehouse of all of a country’s publications. More to the point, the 
former can be accomplished without the latter. Simply, the mandatory-
deposit requirement creates an obligation on publishers that is not 
necessary to serve the chief purpose of the Library of Congress. 
That said, even if a centralized local library is necessary for 
Congress and federal agencies, I find dubious the “great value to the 
public of supplying copies of public works to a national library.”52 
Early proponents of establishing the Library of Congress as a national 
library emphasized that such a library would provide a central location 
for a comprehensive collection of publications.53 However, strictly in 
terms of the time and money it would cost most Americans to visit the 
Library of Congress, I fail to see a value to the public that would justify 
the mandatory-deposit requirement’s burden on publishers. The public 
is not owed free access to any commercial publication, much less the 
vast majority of publications. Public libraries, which are scattered 
throughout the country, are public privileges, not public rights. In 
addition to free access to the vast amount of publications available at 
public libraries—libraries that are more accessible and convenient for 
almost all citizens than is the Library of Congress—the public has an 
array of options for accessing various publications: purchasing from 
bookstores; viewing via the Internet; borrowing from friends, family, 
colleagues, or others; etc. As is the case with public libraries, these 
options are also more accessible and convenient for most Americans 
than is a visit to the Library of Congress. Even if one finds tremendous 
value in having a copy of most publications on file at the Library of 
Congress in Washington D.C., free to view, such value is overridden 
 
 51. See Using the Library’s Collections, supra note 49 (“The enormous size and variety of its 
collections make the Library of Congress the largest library in the world. Comprised of 
approximately 142 million items in virtually all formats, languages and subjects, these collections 
are the single most comprehensive accumulation of human expression ever assembled.”); Research 
and Reference Services: Frequently Asked Questions, LIBR. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/rr/res-
faq.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020) (“While virtually all subject areas are represented in the 
collections, the Library does not attempt to collect comprehensively in the areas of clinical 
medicine and technical agriculture, which are covered by the National Library of Medicine and the 
National Agricultural Library, respectively. Researchers should also note that the Library of 
Congress is distinct from the National Archives, which is the major repository for the official 
records of the United States government.”). 
 52. See STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, supra note 39, at 34. 
 53. Id. 
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by the burden imposed on the publisher. Publishers shouldn’t have to 
pay for the free availability of their publications to the general public. 
B.  Unconstitutional 
In her 1960 committee report, Elizabeth K. Dunne wrote, “If a 
‘legal deposit’ system covering all domestic publications without 
regard to copyright were desired, the consitutional [sic] basis for 
requiring the deposit of works not under copyright would need to be 
considered . . . .”54 Indeed, the constitutionality of the mandatory-
deposit requirement needs to be considered. When it is, it fails on at 
least three bases. 
1.  Fifth Amendment: Takings Clause 
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”55 
The requirements of 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) are a clear violation of 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which states private property cannot be taken for public 
use without payment of just compensation to the property owner.56 
The United States Supreme Court has long acknowledged that the 
Takings Clause clearly covers physical appropriations of private 
property for public use, stating in 1871 that the Takings Clause “has 
always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation.”57 
On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
 
 54. Id. at 33. 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 551 (1871); see also ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
97-112, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY (2015) (“The 
modern period, 1978 to the present, has seen the Court settle into a taxonomy of four fundamental 
types of takings—total regulatory takings, partial regulatory takings, physical takings, and exaction 
takings. The Court in this period also has sought to develop criteria for these four types, and to set 
out ripeness standards and clarify the required remedy. In the preceding period, 1922 to 1978, the 
Court first announced the regulatory taking concept—the notion that government regulation alone, 
without appropriation or physical invasion of property, may be a taking if sufficiently severe. 
During this time, however, it proffered little by way of regulatory takings criteria, continuing rather 
its earlier focus on appropriations and physical occupations. In the earliest period of takings law, 
1870 to 1922, the Court saw the Takings Clause as protecting property owners only from 
appropriations and physical invasions, two forms of government interference with property seen 
by the Court as most functionally similar to an outright condemnation of property. During this 
infancy of takings law, regulatory restrictions were tested under other, non-takings theories, such 
as whether they were within a state’s police power, and were generally upheld.”). 
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the “classic taking” is one “in which the government directly 
appropriates private property for its own use.”58 Such per se takings 
require just compensation to be paid to the deprived property owner.59 
This is precisely the case with section 407(a)’s mandatory-
deposit requirement: it is a “classic taking,” as a book subject to the 
mandatory-deposit requirement is personal property physically taken 
by the government for public use, without compensation. And the 
Takings Clause applies to personal property (such as books), not just 
real property. In Horne v. Department of Agriculture,60 the Supreme 
Court held, 
The first question presented asks “Whether the 
government’s ‘categorical duty’ under the Fifth Amendment 
to pay just compensation when it ‘physically takes 
possession of an interest in property,’ applies only to real 
property and not to personal property.” The answer is no.  
There is no dispute that the “classic taking [is one] in 
which the government directly appropriates private property 
for its own use.” Nor is there any dispute that, in the case of 
real property, such an appropriation is a per se taking that 
requires just compensation.  
Nothing in the text or history of the Takings Clause, or 
our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when it 
comes to appropriation of personal property. The 
Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation 
when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.  
The Takings Clause provides: “[N]or shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
 
 58. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 
(2002); see Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (2015); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 
498, 522 (1998). 
 59. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 321–22 (“The text of the Fifth 
Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a distinction between physical takings and 
regulatory takings. Its plain language requires the payment of compensation whenever the 
government acquires private property for a public purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of 
a condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation. But the Constitution contains no 
comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her 
private property. Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as old as the 
Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward application of per se rules.”). 
 60. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2425. 
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It protects “private property” without any distinction 
between different types.61 
At issue in Horne was the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s California Raisin Marketing Order (CRMO),62 which 
required, “[A] percentage of a grower’s crop must be physically set 
aside in certain years for the account of the Government, free of 
charge. The Government then sells, allocates, or otherwise disposes of 
the raisins in ways it determines are best suited to maintaining an 
orderly market.”63 Raisin farmers Laura and Marvin Horne challenged 
the law as a violation of the Takings Clause, and the Supreme Court 
sided with them, holding, “The reserve requirement imposed by the 
Raisin Committee is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are 
 
 61. Id. at 2425–26 (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V and Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 324). In fact, protections against takings of personal property have a 
longer history than do protections against takings of real property. See William Michael Treanor, 
The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, GEO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y INST. PAPERS & REP. 
2 (1998), https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi_papers/2/ (“In historical context, the 
narrow scope of the Takings Clause is hardly surprising. The clause provided greater protection for 
the property owner than the property owner had traditionally received. England’s Magna Carta did 
not require compensation for government seizure of land. It only required compensation when the 
government took personal property. Thus, crown officials were barred from ‘tak[ing] anyone’s 
grain or other chattels, without immediately paying the money.’ Magna Carta, Art. 28. In contrast, 
the sole limitation on government seizure of land was one of procedural regularity: ‘No free man 
shall be dispossessed . . . except by the legal judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.’ 
Magna Carta, Art. 39. Early colonial charters were similarly limited in scope. Only the 
Massachusetts Body of Liberty, adopted in 1641, required compensation when personal property 
was taken. No colonial charter required compensation for the seizure of land. While property 
owners, in practice, commonly were paid when their land was seized, no colony had a constitutional 
obligation to do so, and, in fact, compensation was not always paid.”); see also James v. Campbell, 
104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882) (“[A patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the 
patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without just 
compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been 
patented to a private purchaser . . . .”). 
 62. 7 C.F.R. § 989 (2004); see also Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California; Order 
Amending Marketing Order No. 989, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,965, 53,968 (Oct. 26, 2018) (to be codified 
at 7 C.F.R. pt. 989). 
 63. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424 (“The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes 
the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate ‘marketing orders’ to help maintain stable markets for 
particular agricultural products. The marketing order for raisins requires growers in certain years 
to give a percentage of their crop to the Government, free of charge. The required allocation is 
determined by the Raisin Administrative Committee, a Government entity composed largely of 
growers and others in the raisin business appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. In 2002-2003, 
this Committee ordered raisin growers to turn over 47 percent of their crop. In 2003-2004, 30 
percent.”). 
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transferred from the growers to the Government. Title to the raisins 
passes to the Raisin Committee.”64 
In the same way, per section 407(a), the government requires 
deposits to the federal government of published works from private-
property owners, so there is a clear physical taking, and title to the 
works passes from their owners to the government. The Institute for 
Justice writes, “The federal government can’t simply force someone 
to turn over their personal property for the government’s own use 
without paying them for it.”65 So, just compensation is required to be 
paid to the deposits’ owners for the deposits. This means that the 
government must use its own funds to pay for the books. The Supreme 
Court has held that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation 
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.”66 Thus, the mandatory-deposit 
requirement’s financial burden properly belongs to the federal 
government, not with those obligated by the requirement, such as 
Valancourt. Quite simply, the government is forcing Valancourt to 
deposit books that it otherwise would not, and Valancourt is paying to 
do so, when the tab properly belongs with the government. As 
Valancourt’s complaint states, “[i]f the government wishes to acquire 
books, it should purchase them with funds raised through general 
taxation.”67 
The fact of section 407(a)’s unconstitutionality is amplified, 
considering the raisin growers subject to the CRMO held a contingent 
interest “in any net proceeds from sales the Raisin Committee makes, 
after deductions for the export subsidies and the Committee’s 
administrative expenses.”68 The Horne Court was not persuaded that 
the contingent interest kept the requirement from constituting a taking, 
writing, 
The reserve requirement imposed by the Raisin 
Committee is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are 
 
 64. Id. at 2428. 
 65. Virginia Books Outdated Federal Law Threatens Unique Richmond Publisher, supra note 
32. 
 66. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 40 (1960). 
 67. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 34, at 14. 
 68. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2424. 
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transferred from the growers to the Government. Title to the 
raisins passes to the Raisin Committee. The Committee’s 
raisins must be physically segregated from free-tonnage 
raisins. Reserve raisins are sometimes left on the premises of 
handlers, but they are held “for the account” of the 
Government. The Committee disposes of what become its 
raisins as it wishes, to promote the purposes of the raisin 
marketing order.  
Raisin growers subject to the reserve requirement thus 
lose the entire “bundle” of property rights in the appropriated 
raisins—“the rights to possess, use and dispose of” them—
with the exception of the speculative hope that some residual 
proceeds may be left when the Government is done with the 
raisins and has deducted the expenses of implementing all 
aspects of the marketing order. The Government’s “actual 
taking of possession and control” of the reserve raisins gives 
rise to a taking as clearly “as if the Government held full title 
and ownership” as it essentially does.69 
Likewise, publishers affected by section 407(a) lose their entire 
bundle of property rights but, unlike the raisin growers subject to the 
CRMO, do not retain any contingent interest. Thus, given that the 
CRMO, which left affected property owners with at least some 
remaining interest in the property, was held to violate the Takings 
Clause, section 407(a) is an even more blatant violation, given that it 
leaves affected property owners with zero interest in their property 
taken. The Horne Court’s reference to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.70 that a physical 
appropriation of private property “is perhaps the most serious form of 
invasion of an owner’s property interests” because it deprives the 
property owner of “the rights to possess, use and dispose of” said 
property expresses the gravity of the deprivation of property caused 
by section 407(a).71 
 
 69. Id. at 2428; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 330 n.25 (2002) (citations omitted) (explaining that under the Supreme Court’s 
physical takings cases, “it would be irrelevant whether a property owner maintained 5% of the 
value of the owner’s property, so long as there was a physical appropriation of any of the parcel”). 
 70. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).   
 71. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 324 (discussing 
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Forcing publishers, at their own expense, to submit copies of their 
published works to the federal government, for use by the federal 
government, is a per se taking—an actual, physical, and complete 
taking of private property for public use that requires payment of just 
compensation to said publishers. As such, unless and until such just 
compensation is paid, application of the mandatory-deposit 
requirement is quite clearly an unconstitutional taking. 
2.  First Amendment: Freedom of Speech 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”72 
Section 407(a) is clear violation of the First Amendment’s 
mandate that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press,” for it restricts the speech freedoms of 
publishers like Valancourt, by forcing them to speak more broadly 
than they might wish to speak (and then pay for such unwanted 
speech).73 Thus, the mandatory-deposit requirement compels speech. 
Just as a publisher is free to publish a particular work, that publisher 
is free not to publish that particular work. Valancourt, like all other 
publishers, has a fundamental right to choose what to publish, but 
section 407(a) forces Valancourt to publish works it otherwise would 
not publish. In other words, publishers have the right to choose when 
to speak, but section 407(a) forces them to speak. 
The First Amendment protects one’s freedom of speech, meaning 
both the freedom to speak and the freedom not to speak. In West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,74 the Supreme Court 
held,  
The right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed 
by the Constitution against State action includes both the 
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at 
 
the distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings: “Land-use regulations are 
ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some tangential way—often in completely 
unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings would transform government regulation 
into a luxury few governments could afford. By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, 
easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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all, except insofar as essential operations of government may 
require it for the preservation of an orderly society,—as in 
the case of compulsion to give evidence in court.75  
In his concurring opinion, Justice Murphy spoke of “the freedom of 
the individual to be vocal or silent according to his conscience or 
personal inclination.”76 In Wooley v. Maynard,77 the Supreme Court 
held, 
We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of 
thought protected by the First Amendment against state 
action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to 
refrain from speaking at all. A system which secures the right 
to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes 
must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster 
such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from 
speaking are complementary components of the broader 
concept of “individual freedom of mind.” This is illustrated 
by the recent case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), where we held 
unconstitutional a Florida statute placing an affirmative duty 
upon newspapers to publish the replies of political candidates 
whom they had criticized. We concluded that such a 
requirement deprived a newspaper of the fundamental right 
to decide what to print or omit . . . .78 
Individual freedom fundamentally includes the freedom not to 
speak, not to express oneself—the freedom to be silent. This is true 
not just for individuals but also the press. In Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo,79 the Supreme Court held, 
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to 
comply with a compulsory access law and would not be 
forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the 
inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the 
barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into 
the function of editors. A newspaper is more than a passive 
 
 75. Id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 646. 
 77. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 78. Id. at 714 (citations omitted). 
 79. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
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receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. 
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the 
decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of 
the paper, and treatment of public issues and public 
officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of 
editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated 
how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be 
exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a 
free press as they have evolved to this time.80 
Anna M. Taruschio writes, “The Court based its decision on editorial, 
not individual, autonomy, holding that the marketplace of ideas 
interest held out by the state in its mandatory right of reply statute 
could not defeat the newspaper’s editorial autonomy interest in 
deciding what to print in its own pages.”81 Likewise, publishers are 
free to decide what to print and what not to print, when to print and 
when not to print. The First Amendment protects these rights.82 Of the 
right not to speak, Taruschio writes that “a fundamental premise of 
right not to speak doctrine” is “that compelled speech, by infringing 
on an autonomy right, triggers First Amendment protection.”83 
According to Taruschio, “the First Amendment always protects an 
individual’s autonomy interest.”84 
But, of course, First Amendment protections are not absolute. The 
government can restrict fundamental freedoms, provided such 
restrictions survive the requisite constitutional scrutiny. In general, 
commercial speech85 is subject to intermediate constitutional scrutiny, 
 
 80. Id. at 258. 
 81. Anna M. Taruschio, The First Amendment, the Right Not to Speak and the Problem of 
Government Access Statutes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1015 (2000). 
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 83. Taruschio, supra note 81, at 1036. 
 84. Id. at 1037. Taruschio writes of  
the dual nature of the protection that the right not to speak affords: first, the 
right to disassociate oneself from speech with which one disagrees, and 
second, the right to control over the right to speak or not to speak at all. Thus, 
the right not to speak comprises both the autonomy right to resist compelled 
speech and also the absolute right to remain silent unless and until one chooses 
to break that silence.  
Id. at 1039. She states that “the autonomy promised by the Bill of Rights and repeatedly affirmed 
by Supreme Court jurisprudence protects the right not to speak.” Id. at 1051. 
 85. Commercial speech is speech “related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and 
its audience.” See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). It 
is speech that proposes a “commercial transaction.” Id. at 562. 
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meaning any law restricting commercial speech must advance a 
substantial government interest and must not be any broader than is 
necessary to advance such interest.86 But reviewing the mandatory-
deposit requirement under intermediate scrutiny is problematic for at 
least two reasons. 
Firstly, the speech compelled by the mandatory-deposit 
requirement is not commercial in nature. Forcing publishers to deposit 
to the Library of Congress copies of their works is not within the realm 
of commercial speech. Publishers are not depositing works for 
financial gain. They are not choosing to participate in commerce. This 
is not advertising. Rather, the speech involved here is speaking, 
generally. It is the fundamental freedom not to speak at all, 
commercially or otherwise. Such speech merits higher scrutiny than 
that afforded commercial speech. 
Secondly, the mandatory-deposit requirement does not restrict 
speech but, rather, compels it; so a standard for reviewing laws 
restricting speech would not seem to apply to a law compelling 
speech. However, one can view forcing someone to speak as a 
restriction on speech, because it restricts that person’s freedom not to 
speak. Viewed as such, all that would remain would be the first issue: 
the speech is not commercial in nature. That said, one could make the 
argument that publishers publish for financial gain—that they publish 
copies that are for sale—and that this makes the speech commercial in 
nature. This argument would likely advance the notion that though the 
specific copies affected by the mandatory-deposit requirement are not 
part of any commercial market, commerce is the reason for the original 
publishing of those works. If this argument prevails, then the correct 
standard of constitutional review for the mandatory-deposit 
requirement is intermediate scrutiny. 
On the other hand, if one rejects the argument that the speech 
mandated by the mandatory-deposit requirement is commercial 
speech, then the appropriate level of constitutional review for the 
 
 86. Id. at 566 (“In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the 
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For 
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not 
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest.”). 
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mandatory-deposit requirement should be the highest level—strict 
scrutiny—because section 407(a) compels speech. According to the 
Supreme Court, “[m]andating speech that a speaker would not 
otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech.”87 So, the 
mandatory-deposit requirement is a content-based regulation of 
speech, since it mandates speech that publishers would not otherwise 
necessarily make. The Supreme Court has written, 
The Government may, however, regulate the content of 
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a 
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to 
further the articulated interest. . . . The Government may 
serve this legitimate interest, but to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, “it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations 
designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily 
interfering with First Amendment freedoms.” It is not 
enough to show that the Government’s ends are compelling; 
the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.88 
Thus, for a law to survive strict scrutiny, that law must be narrowly 
tailored to a compelling state interest and must be the least-restrictive 
means of achieving that interest. So, which standard of constitutional 
review should apply: intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny? Or 
perhaps a standard that lies between those two? 
The type of speech compelled by the mandatory-deposit 
requirement is not the type of compelled speech that forces someone 
to profess a belief or speak an opinion with which she disagrees. If it 
were, strict scrutiny would certainly apply.89 This is also not a 
 
 87. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 781 (1988). The Supreme Court continued, 
“We therefore consider the Act as a content-based regulation of speech. See Miami Herald Publ’g 
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 256 (1974) (statute compelling newspaper to print an editorial reply 
“exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper”).”  Id. at 795. 
 88. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980)). 
 89. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 220–21 (2013) 
(“But the Policy Requirement goes beyond preventing recipients from using private funds in a way 
that would undermine the federal program. It requires them to pledge allegiance to the 
Government’s policy of eradicating prostitution. As to that, we cannot improve upon what Justice 
Jackson wrote for the Court 70 years ago: ‘If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein.’ Barnette, 319 U.S., at 642. The Policy Requirement compels as a condition of federal 
funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the 
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compelled commercial disclosure, in which the government requires a 
seller of goods or services to include certain messages in 
advertisements, meant to inform the public about the goods or 
services. If it were, rational-basis scrutiny would certainly apply.90 
Rather, the mandatory-disclosure requirement is simply a requirement 
that a publisher produce and submit to the federal government extra 
copies of a published work (i.e., non-commercial speech). The 
message contained therein is the choice of the speaker’s, but the 
decision to express that message via the mandated copy disclosure is 
not. 
 
Government program. In so doing, it violates the First Amendment and cannot be sustained.”); 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (“We are thus faced with the question of whether 
the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an 
ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose 
that it be observed and read by the public. We hold that the State may not do so.”); W. Va. State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein.”). 
 90. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 650–
51 (1985) (“We have, to be sure, held that in some instances compulsion to speak may be as 
violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on speech. See, e. g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 
U.S. 705 (1977); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Indeed, in W. Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court went so far as to state that 
‘involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds 
than silence.’ Id. at 633. But the interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those 
discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio has not attempted to ‘prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess 
by word or act their faith therein.’ Id. at 642. The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement 
that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the 
terms under which his services will be available. Because the extension of First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the 
information such speech provides, see Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976), appellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular 
factual information in his advertising is minimal. Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech 
decisions to date, we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench much more 
narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech, ‘[warnings] or 
[disclaimers] might be appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer 
confusion or deception.’ In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982). Accord, Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 
at 565; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Va. Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 772, 
n.24. We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the advertiser’s First 
Amendment rights at all. We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure 
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech. But we 
hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are 
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”). 
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Since non-commercial speech is more protected than is 
commercial speech91 and since a restriction on commercial speech is 
generally subject to intermediate scrutiny (though, as stated above, 
compelled commercial disclosures are subject to rational-basis review, 
and though some commercial-speech restrictions have been subjected 
to heightened scrutiny92), it stands to reason that the mandatory-
disclosure requirement, which forces non-commercial speech, would, 
at a minimum, be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny. And, at most, 
it is akin to the forced-profession/opinion variety that would be judged 
under strict scrutiny. 
For purposes of this Article, I give the benefit of the doubt (about 
where the speech mandated by the mandated-disclosure requirement 
falls on the speech continuum) to the government and accept that the 
speech affected by the mandatory-deposit requirement is more 
protected than compelled commercial disclosures but less protected 
than being compelled to profess a certain belief. In such case, 
intermediate scrutiny would apply; and my contention is that when 
reviewed under intermediate scrutiny, the justifications for the 
mandatory-deposit requirement are insufficient to outweigh its 
injuries to publishers. As such, the mandatory-deposit requirement 
would also not survive any level of review more stringent than 
 
 91. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) 
(“Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized ‘the “commonsense” distinction between speech 
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government 
regulation, and other varieties of speech.’ The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.” (citations omitted)). 
 92. See Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 & 
n.24 (1976) (“In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have 
not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are commonsense differences 
between speech that does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction,’ and other varieties. 
Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus 
subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of 
protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is 
unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its 
disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the 
advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself 
provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be 
more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is 
little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.” (citation omitted)); 
see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566–67 (2011) (“The State argues that heightened 
judicial scrutiny is unwarranted because its law is a mere commercial regulation. It is true that 
restrictions on protected expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more 
generally, on nonexpressive conduct.”). 
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intermediate scrutiny, including strict scrutiny. Thus, regardless of 
which level of review that could legitimately be applied to it, the 
mandatory-deposit requirement should not survive constitutional 
scrutiny and should, therefore, be invalidated. 
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the government must show93 
that the mandatory-deposit requirement (1) directly advances a 
substantial government interest; and (2) that is no more extensive than 
necessary to advance that interest.94 At best, the mandatory-deposit 
requirement meets the first requirement but not the second 
requirement. At worst, it meets neither. 
a.  First requirement 
Though I believe the mandatory-deposit requirement does not 
advance a substantial government interest,95 I will concede on this 
element, for the case against me on this element is far more legitimate 
than is the case against me for the second element. And I believe that, 
without a doubt, the second element is not met, so conceding the first 
element is not fatal to my position, since both elements are required, 
in order to pass the requisite constitutional scrutiny. 
So, for purposes of concession, the mandatory-deposit 
requirement directly advances the government’s interest in supplying 
copies of publications to the Library of Congress. As previously noted, 
the first purpose of the mandatory-deposit requirement “to identify the 
copyrighted work in connection with copyright registration”96 is no 
longer applicable and is, thus, not a substantial government interest. 
Ainsworth Spofford’s goal of creating a comprehensive, national 
 
 93. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (“The State must assert a substantial interest to be 
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.”). 
 94. Id. at 566 (“In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the 
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For 
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not 
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest.”). 
 95. See generally Part IV, Section A (It is unclear precisely what this second purpose is truly 
about. Is it about building the country’s intellectual and cultural reputation—the early rhetoric 
mentioned above indicates as much—or about meeting the needs of the Library of Congress? These 
are entirely different propositions, but my position is that, in either case, the reason is insufficient 
to justify the mandatory-deposit requirement.). 
 96. STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, supra note 39. 
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library to serve the needs of Congress and the public is worthwhile, 
directly relating to educating our nation’s leaders and citizenry and to 
establishing and maintaining our intellectual and cultural standing in 
the world. Surely, this is a substantial interest directly advanced by the 
mandatory-deposit requirement. 
b.  Second requirement 
Accepting that the mandatory-deposit requirement directly 
advances a substantial government interest, it is certainly more 
extensive than necessary to advance that interest. So, even if the first 
requirement of intermediate scrutiny is satisfied, the second is not, as 
there are other means to advance the government’s interest that impose 
less of a burden on publishers than does the mandatory-deposit 
requirement. 
Plainly, if the federal government’s acquiring copies of published 
works serves to advance a substantial government interest, there are 
ways to acquire such copies other than by requiring publishers to 
furnish, on their own dime, copies of their publications to the 
government. On this point, Valancourt’s complaint states, 
There is no government interest served by the deposit 
requirement that could not be served equally well by less 
restrictive means such as the government purchasing the 
works it desires or by relying on the many avenues (like the 
cataloging-in-publication program or the deposit 
requirement for publishers who wish to register their 
copyrights) by which the government can acquire works 
voluntarily.97 
Each of the three options mentioned in the complaint would be less 
burdensome on Valancourt and other publishers than is the 
mandatory-deposit requirement. 
Firstly, and obviously, if the federal government purchases 
publications, then the burden on publishers is drastically diminished. 
Thus, the mandatory-deposit requirement, which forces publishers to 
bear the costs of furnishing works to the federal government, is more 
extensive than necessary to advance any substantial government 
interest in obtaining copies of published works. Granted, publishers 
 
 97. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 34, at 15. 
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would still bear the burden of using their time and effort to submit the 
required deposits, but this burden is much less than the burden of time, 
effort, and expense. 
Secondly, publishers can freely choose to submit to the Library 
of Congress copies of their publications, as required by the Library of 
Congress’s Cataloging in Publication Program,98 which offers 
publishers certain benefits. According to the Library of Congress,  
[a] Cataloging in Publication record (aka CIP data) is a 
bibliographic record prepared by the Library of Congress for 
a book that has not yet been published. When the book is 
published, the publisher includes the CIP data on the copyright 
page thereby facilitating book processing for libraries and 
book dealers.99 
Publishers like Valancourt are not forced to take part in the program 
but are free to do so, so the program is less burdensome on publishers 
than is the mandatory-deposit requirement. And every copy submitted 
to the Library of Congress for purposes of the program is another copy 
that helps advance any substantial government interest in obtaining 
copies of published works. Admittedly, the optional program 
presumably would not yield as many copies as the mandatory-deposit 
requirement, but it would still advance any substantial government 
interest in obtaining copies of published works. That it would not 
advance it as much as a mandatory program does not nullify its ability 
 
 98. About CIP, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/publish/cip/about/index.html (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2020).  
There is no charge for CIP processing. However, participating publishers are 
obligated to send a complimentary copy of all books for which CIP data was 
provided immediately upon publication. Publishers failing to meet this 
obligation may be suspended from the program. Please note that all books 
submitted to the Library of Congress in compliance with the CIP Program are 
property of the Library of Congress. 
Frequently Asked Questions, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/publish/cip/faqs/ (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2020). Note:  
There is no relationship between the CIP Program and Copyright. The main 
purpose of copyright records is to document the intellectual or creative 
ownership of a work. The main purpose of a CIP record is to record the 
bibliographic data elements of a work and facilitate access to it in library 
catalogs. Separate deposits are required to fulfill either mandatory deposit 
(Section 407) or copyright registration (Section 408) of US Copyright Law.  
Id. 
 99. Cataloging in Publication Program, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/publish/cip/ 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
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to satisfy the second requirement of intermediate scrutiny. Since the 
mandatory-deposit requirement is, well, mandatory, it is more 
restrictive to the freedom of publishers than is the optional Cataloging 
in Publication Program. Thus, it is more extensive than necessary to 
advance any substantial government interest in obtaining copies of 
published works. 
Finally, section 408 of the Copyright Act requires a copy of any 
work for which copyright registration is filed.100 This certainly 
advances any substantial government interest in obtaining copies of 
published works. And like the Cataloging in Publication Program, 
copyright registration is optional, so it doesn’t force publishers to 
submit to the federal government copies of their works. Thus, the 
copyright-deposit requirement is less burdensome to publishers than 
is the mandatory-deposit requirement, which is, as a result, more 
extensive than necessary to advance any substantial government 
interest in obtaining copies of published works. 
What binds each of these and, thus, what makes each less 
burdensome to publishers than the mandatory-deposit requirement is 
that a publisher either freely chooses to furnish a copy of a publication 
to the federal government or is forced to do so but is paid just 
compensation for doing so. By contrast, the mandatory-deposit 
requirement forces publishers to submit copies of their works yet does 
not pay them for doing so; instead, the publishers bear the expenses. 
In summary, section 407(a) violates the First Amendment’s 
requirement that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press,”101 because it forces publishers like 
Valancourt to speak, when the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
freedom of speech includes the freedom not to speak. Thus, the 
mandatory-deposit requirement compels speech and does so without 
sufficient justification, at least without one strong enough to survive 
intermediate constitutional scrutiny. As such, section 407(a) is 
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. 
 
 100. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2005).  
 101. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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3.  Fifth Amendment: Equal Protection via the Due Process Clause 
“No person . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”102 
Another possible objection to the mandatory-deposit requirement 
is that it violates the equal-protection guarantees of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution, as it does not treat all publishers 
equally, exempting certain published works from the requirement.103 
37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c) lists twelve categories of works that are exempt 
from the mandatory-deposit requirement.104 Thus, the mandatory-
deposit requirement forces some publishers, but not others, to deposit 
works, depending on the type of publication. 
For example, unlike most physical books, e-books are exempt 
from section 407(a).105 In addition, many types of physical 
publications are not subject to the mandate. Among others; “Greeting 
cards, picture postcards, and stationery”; “Lectures, sermons, 
speeches, and addresses when published individually and not as a 
collection of the works of one or more authors”; “Prints, labels, and 
other advertising matter, including catalogs, published in connection 
with the rental lease, lending, licensing, or sale of articles of 
 
 102. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 103. See 17 U.S.C. § 407(c). 
 104. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19 (2018). 
 105. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 7D: MANDATORY DEPOSIT OF COPIES OR 
PHONORECORDS FOR THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ07d.pdf 
(last updated Mar. 2019) (“As noted elsewhere in this circular, the mandatory deposit requirement 
applies only to works published in the United States. Accordingly, unpublished works and works 
that are published solely outside the United States are not subject to this requirement. Most works 
that are published only online are not subject to mandatory deposit. Under Copyright Office 
regulations, the following categories of published works are also exempt from mandatory deposit 
because they are not selected for addition to the Library of Congress collections or for use in 
national library programs. NOTE: A work exempt from mandatory deposit is not exempt from the 
deposit requirements for copyright registration. • Tests and answer material published separately 
from other works; • Individually published speeches, sermons, lectures, and addresses; • Works 
originally published as part of a collective work (although the collective work itself may be subject 
to mandatory deposit); • Literary, dramatic, and musical works published only in phonorecords 
(although the recording itself may be subject to mandatory deposit from the copyright owner or 
publisher of the sound recording); • Motion picture soundtracks (although the motion picture itself 
may be subject to mandatory deposit); • Motion pictures published solely through a license or grant 
to a nonprofit institution to make a fixation of that program directly from a transmission to the 
public; • Scientific or technical diagrams, models, plans, or designs; • Advertising materials, 
including catalogs; • Three-dimensional sculptural works; • Jewelry; • Dolls, toys, and games; • 
Plaques; • Floor coverings, wallpaper and similar commercial wall coverings, textiles and other 
fabrics; • Packaging materials; • Useful articles; and • Online-only electronic works, with the 
exception of electronic serials that have been demanded by the Copyright Office”). 
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merchandise, works of authorship, or services”; “Works first 
published as individual contributions to collective works”; and 
“Works first published outside the United States and later published 
in the United States without change in copyrightable content” are 
exempt from the mandatory-deposit requirements of section 407(a).106 
Therefore, the statute does not treat all publishers the same, based on 
the medium or content of their publications. It forces some speech but 
not other speech. Such disparate treatment by the federal government 
clearly triggers equal-protection analysis. 
That said, an argument can be made that attacking the mandatory-
deposit requirement on equal-protection grounds might be 
unnecessary, given that the free-speech protections of the First 
Amendment provide a sufficient basis for arguing for the 
unconstitutionality of the requirement. In his article Basic Equal 
Protection Analysis,107 Russell W. Galloway, Jr. writes, 
In recent years, the Court has suggested that the 
fundamental rights strand of equal protection theory may be 
redundant and slated for cancellation. If government action 
infringes the claimant’s fundamental right, strict scrutiny 
should be applicable on that basis alone without reference to 
the equal protection clause. For example, a content-based 
infringement of free speech rights of labor unions triggers 
strict scrutiny under the first amendment itself, so the equal 
protection clause is not needed. Similarly, selective 
interference with the right of privacy can be curtailed under 
the due process clauses without help from equal protection 
theory.108 
Thus, it is possible that using the First Amendment to argue against 
the mandatory-deposit requirement, as explored above, is enough. But 
if only to attempt to solidify the case against the legality of the 
 
 106. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(2), (3), (7), (9), (10) (2018). “Works first published outside the 
United States and later published in the United States without change in copyrightable content” are 
exempt from the mandatory-deposit requirements of § 407(a) only if only if “[r]egistration for the 
work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 before the work was published in the United States; or (ii) 
[r]egistration for the work was made under 17 U.S.C. 408 after the work was published in the 
United States but before a demand for deposit is made under 17 U.S.C. 407(d).” Id. § 
202.19(c)(10)(i)–(ii).  
 107. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121 
(1989).  
 108. Id. at 150 (footnotes omitted). 
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requirement, I will assume the Equal Protection Clause is not 
redundant; and I will, thus, explore the requirement from an equal-
protection perspective. 
Under traditional First Amendment free-speech analysis, for 
content-neutral speech rules (e.g., exemptions based on medium of 
publication), intermediate scrutiny applies.109 For content-based 
speech rules (e.g., exemptions based on subject matter of publication), 
strict scrutiny applies.110 But as explored in the section above, under 
either intermediate or strict scrutiny, section 407(a) does not survive 
constitutional scrutiny, under traditional free-speech-restriction 
analysis. 
But this third possible objection is not based on the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech but rather on the Fifth’s 
guarantee of equal protection under the law. Here, section 407(a) does 
not impact all forms of speech to the same degree. On the contrary, 
some speech is forced, while some is unaffected. All published works 
are not treated equally by the federal government; and when the 
federal government fails to protect everyone equally under the law, its 
actions are judged with the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny. 
Here, the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny should be 
strict scrutiny, the highest level of scrutiny, which applies when a 
 
 109. R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A 
Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2084 (2016) (“In contrast to 
the most typical approaches to speech restrictions categorized as content-based, content-neutral 
regulations commonly receive less exacting, less demanding, mid-level judicial scrutiny. There are 
certainly variations among the content-neutral test formulations, but the most broadly applied 
formulations seem to require a significant or substantial government interest.” (quoting Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) and Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014)). 
 110. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 118 (1991) (“The Son of Sam law establishes a financial disincentive to create or publish 
works with a particular content. In order to justify such differential treatment, ‘the State must show 
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end.’” (quoting Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987))); see also 
Wright, supra note 109, at 2083 (“To illustrate the basic problem through the most recent case law, 
it is helpful to begin with a brief reminder of the differences in the judicial tests applied to 
regulations of speech, which are contingent upon the initial classification as content-neutral or 
content-based. Once a court has made the initial classification, content-based regulations of speech 
are generally subjected to a particularly rigorous and exacting degree of judicial scrutiny. 
Traditionally, this strict scrutiny encompasses two requirements. Specifically, the speech regulation 
in such a case must promote a compelling or overridingly important government interest, and the 
regulation must be necessary to the narrowly tailored promotion of that interest.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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fundamental right is affected;111 the mandatory-deposit requirement 
impacts free speech, a fundamental right guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.112 To survive strict scrutiny, a law must serve a 
compelling government interest and be necessary to promote that 
interest. In addition, the law must be narrowly tailored, and there must 
be no less restrictive means available to promote that interest.113 As is 
 
 111. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be 
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on 
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 112. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (citing 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)) (stating that free speech is entitled to “comprehensive 
protection under the first amendment.”). 
 113. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973) (“In subjecting to 
strict judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational residency 
requirement as a precondition to receiving AFDC benefits, the Court explained: ‘(I)n moving from 
State to State . . . appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which 
serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling 
governmental interest, is unconstitutional.’”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (“At 
the outset, we reject appellants’ argument that a mere showing of a rational relationship between 
the waiting period and these four admittedly permissible state objectives will suffice to justify the 
classification. The waiting-period provision denies welfare benefits to otherwise eligible applicants 
solely because they have recently moved into the jurisdiction. But in moving from State to State or 
to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification 
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.” (citations omitted)); see also Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (“But if it was not clear then, it is certainly clear now that a 
more exacting test is required for any statute that ‘place[s] a condition on the exercise of the right 
to vote.’ This development in the law culminated in Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra. 
There we canvassed in detail the reasons for strict review of statutes distributing the franchise, 
noting inter alia that such statutes ‘constitute the foundation of our representative society.’ We 
concluded that if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the 
franchise to others, ‘the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest.’ This is the test we apply here.” (citations omitted)); id. at 338–39 
(“Although in Shapiro we specifically did not decide whether durational residence requirements 
could be used to determine voting eligibility, we concluded that since the right to travel was a 
constitutionally protected right, ‘any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is 
unconstitutional.’” (citations omitted)); id. at 342 (“In sum, durational residence laws must be 
measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate 
that such laws are ‘necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.’” (first emphasis 
added) (citations omitted)); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1969) 
(“‘In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider 
the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, 
and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.’ And, in this case, we must 
give the statute a close and exacting examination. ‘Since the right to exercise the franchise in a free 
and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged 
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.’ This 
careful examination is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the 
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true when intermediate scrutiny applies, when strict scrutiny applies, 
the burden is on the government to overcome a presumption of 
unconstitutionality.114 
Publishers are not treated equally under the law when they are 
forced to speak, while certain others are not. The disparate treatment—
the unequal protection under the law—of publishers is clear. What is 
left to decide is whether such unequal protection is constitutionally 
permissible, under strict-scrutiny review. It is not. 
Even if it is found that the government’s interest in acquiring 
public works for use in a national library is compelling (I do not 
believe it is115) and that the mandatory-deposit requirement is 
necessary to promote that interest (I do not believe it is), it is certainly 
not the case that the mandatory-deposit requirement is narrowly 
tailored to promote that interest, or that there are no less restrictive 
means for promoting that interest. Clearly, there are other ways to 
achieve the government’s objective, most notably the government’s 
paying just compensation to publishers for any and all published 
works the government desires. Additionally, the legislature could 
change federal copyright law to make deposits a requirement of 
copyright protection. Also, the Library of Congress’s voluntary 
Cataloging in Publication Program, discussed above, could be the 
primary way the government acquires copies of published works. Each 
of these means is less intrusive than a requirement that, unrelated to 
copyright protection, forces a publisher to submit and pay for copies 
of published works. 
In sum, strict scrutiny is the appropriate test to apply to the 
mandatory-deposit requirement, which forces certain publishers to 
 
foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may 
participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of 
representative government. Thus, state apportionment statutes, which may dilute the effectiveness 
of some citizens’ votes, receive close scrutiny from this Court. No less rigid an examination is 
applicable to statutes denying the franchise to citizens who are otherwise qualified by residence and 
age. Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of 
denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect 
their lives. Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents 
of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether 
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” (citations omitted)). 
 114. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (“The burden, however, 
is on those defending the discrimination to make out the claimed justification . . . .”). 
 115. See Wright, supra note 109, at 2099 (“Formalistically, a compelling interest is described 
as ‘of the highest order,’ ‘overriding,’ or ‘paramount.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
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speak, based on the content and/or medium of their publication; and 
the mandatory-deposit requirement does not survive strict scrutiny. 
But even if intermediate scrutiny (law must advance a substantial 
government interest and must not be any broader than is necessary to 
advance such interest) applies to the mandatory-deposit requirement, 
the requirement still does not survive, since it is broader than 
necessary to advance the government’s interest, given that there exist 
other less-intrusive means to advance said interest.116 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The mandatory-deposit requirement of section 407(a) of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 is unconstitutional. It takes private property 
from publishers for public use, without the payment of just 
compensation to the publishers, in violation of the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, by forcing publishers to speak, 
mandatory-deposit requirement impermissibly restricts the free-
speech rights of publishers, which include the right not to speak, as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Finally, by forcing certain 
publications to be deposited, while others are exempted (based on the 
content and/or medium of publication), the mandatory-deposit 
requirement does not give publishers equal protection under the law, 
as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
As such, my recommendation is to repeal section 407(a). In its 
absence, should the federal government decide to pursue its goal of 
collecting copies of published works for public use at the Library of 
Congress (or elsewhere), several options are available to the federal 
government to advance its goal, each of which is less burdensome to 
publishers than section 407(a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Under this four-part test a restraint on commercial ‘communication 
[that] is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity’ is subject to an intermediate level of 
scrutiny, and suppression is permitted whenever it ‘directly advances’ a ‘substantial’ governmental 
interest and is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”). 
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